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 [Application of the propensity evidence rule in paedophilia cases 
starkly highlights the tension between the two competing principles 
underlying the rule. Paedophilia is an area where the danger of 
prejudice is at its highest. At the same time the probative significance 
of propensity evidence may be great. In their habitual offending 
behaviour, paedophiles seek to establish opportunity and overcome the 
child’s resistance to the sexual acts, typically through a long and 
drawn out grooming process in a manner calculated to minimise the 
risk of detection. Evidence of similar misconduct of the accused may be 
highly probative in establishing this pattern of paedophilia behaviour, 
and a proper factor to be taken account of in balancing probative 
value against risk of prejudice. In this context the Hoch/Pfennig test for 
admissibility is unduly strict. A more satisfactory balance between 
probative value and danger of prejudice may be achieved under the 
provisions of the uniform Evidence Acts and the pre-Hoch/Pfennig 
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person. Yet, as a result of the nature of offending itself, propensity evidence 
may be crucial in the successful prosecution of offenders. Typically 
compulsive, systematic and calculative in their behaviour, paedophiles often 
offend in such a way as to minimise the risk of detection. The nature and the 
effects of offending behaviour present serious difficulties in the successful 
prosecution of paedophiles where the only evidence available is frequently the 
testimony of the complainant or complainants. This article seeks to examine 
the various tests for admissibility of propensity evidence in their application 
to offences of paedophilia. It will be suggested that the balancing process that 
determines admissibility should not be limited to a search for striking 
similarities or other peculiarities in the specific acts alleged, but should take 
account also of overall patterns of offending behaviour. 
 
II  THE NATURE OF PAEDOPHILIA 
 
A  Defining Paedophilia 
There is no common law or statutory definition of ‘paedophilia’1 as there is no 
such crime recognised by the law. Rather paedophile activity is criminalised 
by offences such as rape, indecent assault, incest, sexual penetration of a child 
and other similar offences.2 At the medical level, paedophilia is defined via 
the use of three diagnostic criteria: 
 
A.  Over a period of at least 6 months, recurrent, intense sexually arousing 
fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviours involving sexual activity with a 
pre-pubescent child or children (generally aged 13 years or younger); 
B. The fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviours cause clinically significant 
distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas 
of functioning; and 
C. The person is at least 16 years and at least 5 years older than the child 




                                                 
1 Also spelled ‘pedophilia’. 
2 Joint Committee on the National Crime Authority, Parliament of Australia 
Organised Criminal Paedophile Activity (1995) [2.2]: 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/acc_ctte/ncapedo/report/c02.htm> (26 
March 2004). 
3 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-1V) (4th ed, 1994) 528. 
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A purely medical definition is both over and under-inclusive of the relevant 
group of offenders.4 First, people falling within the definition are not 
necessarily offenders, as not all people act on their sexual fantasies.5 For 
purposes of the criminal law, the term ‘paedophile’ is restricted to persons 
who illegally act out their sexual fantasies or urges. Secondly, the definition 
does not capture all offenders; eg, a repeat child sex offender who has a job 
and is in an adult relationship may not fall within the medical definition due to 
an apparent lack of distress or impairment in social or occupational 
functioning.6 For present purposes, child sex offenders with no apparent 
‘impairment’ are included in the definition of ‘paedophile’. 
 
The definition defines the offender target group in both biological and age 
terms; ie pre-pubescence and 13 years of age. Although it may be more 
meaningful for psychiatric purposes to classify paedophiles according to the 
biological characteristics of the child,7 the law delineates sexual offences 
against children by specified age groups.8 Conventionally the term 
‘paedophile’ is used in Australia to refer to offences committed against 
children up to at least the age of 16 years,9 and this approach will be followed. 
 
B  Profiling Offenders   
Identifying what the typical paedophile looks like, in terms of constructing a 
‘profile’, is useful in understanding the nature of offending. The difficulty is 
that paedophilia covers a wide range of behaviour including the ‘one off’ 
fondling of a clothed child to regular and repetitive sexual intercourse with a 
number of children. The heterogeneity of offenders is well recognised by 
writers and it has been acknowledged that there is no such person as the 
‘typical paedophile’:10 a ‘single common denominator has yet to be found’.11 
Another factor that limits paedophile profiling is the fact that most research is 
conducted on convicted offenders, who may not be representative of  
 
                                                 
4 See generally Devon Polaschek, ‘The Classification of Sex Offenders’ in Tony 
Ward, D Richard Laws and Stephen Hudson (eds), Sexual Deviance Issues and 
Controversies (2003) 154, 156-8. 
5 Ibid 156. 
6 Ibid 157. 
7 Dennis Howitt, Paedophiles and Sexual Offences Againist Children (1995) 17. 
8 See, eg, Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) ss 45-49A. 
9 Joint Committee on the National Crime Authority, Parliament of Australia, above n 
2, [2.6]. 
10 Howitt, above n 7, 11; Polaschek, above n 4, 154; David Finkelhor, Child Sexual 
Abuse: New Theory and Research (1984) 36. 
11 Howitt, above n 7, 33. 
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paedophiles generally.12 Also, this research assumes that the personality traits 
of convicted paedophiles are similar to those pre-disclosure of the offence.13 
 
Notwithstanding these limitations, certain characteristics are prevalent among 
offenders and offending behaviour. For instance, the overwhelming majority 
of offenders are male:14 survey reports indicate that well over 90 per cent of 
paedophiles are men.15 However, several writers have conceded that female 
offenders may be under-represented in the statistics for a variety of reasons.16 
Many paedophiles become aware of their sexual fantasies and orientations 
during adolescence,17 with paedophiliac behaviour typically starting during 
adolescence.18 And contrary to the ‘dangerous stranger’ image, the 
overwhelming majority of offenders are known to their victims19 – either as a 
family member, neighbour, family friend or an adult met through the victim’s 
peer associations – with Victorian statistics indicating that over 90 per cent of  
 
 
                                                 
12 John Murray, ‘Psychological Profile of Pedophiles and Child Molesters’ (2000) 
134(2) The Journal of Psychology 211, 211, 213, 220. See also Jean Renvoize, 
Innocence Destroyed: A Study of Child Sexual Abuse (1993) 109-10. Renvoize 
discusses a study by Professor D J West which found that, compared to convicted 
offenders, paedophiles who had not been charged with any offences tended to be 
more confident, assertive, better educated, more representative of professional men, 
and more likely to have jobs where their work brought them into contact with 
children. 
13 Kevin Wallis, ‘Perspectives on Offenders’ in Freda Briggs (ed), From Victim to 
Offender: How Child Sexual Abuse Victims Become Offenders (1995) 1, 3. 
14 Joint Committee on the National Crime Authority, Parliament of Australia, above n 
2, [2.17]; Murray, above n 12, 211; Freda Briggs (ed), From Victim to Offender: How 
Child Sexual Abuse Victims Become Offenders (1995) ch xii. 
15 Joint Committee on the National Crime Authority, Parliament of Australia, above n 
2, [2.17]. See also Vikki Petraitis and Chris O’Connor, Rockspider: The Danger of 
Paedophiles – Untold Stories (1999) 123. 
16 For discussion on reasons why female offenders are less likely to be reported see: 
Briggs,, above n 14, ch xii; T Marvasti, ‘Incestuous Mothers’ (1986) 7(4) American 
Journal of Forensic Psychiatry (1986) 63, 63-9; Howitt, above n 7, 49-50; Renvoize, 
above n 12, 115-17. 
17 Joint Committee on the National Crime Authority, Parliament of Australia, above n 
2, [2.18]. 
18 Wallis, above n 13, 11; Petraitis and O’Connor, above n 15, 131. However, some 
offenders may not start offending until mid-life: see Murray, above n 12, 212; Joint 
Committee on the National Crime Authority, Parliament of Australia, above n 2, 
[2.18]. 
19 Petraitis and O’Connor, above n 15, 45; Wallis, above n 13, 2; Renvoize, above n 
12, 101; Murray, above n 12, 214. 
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victims knew their offender.20 Indeed, research suggests that fathers are the 
most common abusers with claims that natural fathers represent as high as 36 
per cent of all offenders.21 In terms of the commission of the offence, most 
sexual abuse takes place in the offender’s home or other private place.22 
 
C  Theories of Paedophilia 
Various theories have been developed to explain and assist understanding of 
paedophile behaviour. One model that recognises and attempts to explain the 
diversity in behaviour is Finkelhor’s ‘Four-Preconditions Model of Sexual 
Abuse’.23 
 
Under this theory, Finkelhor identifies four preconditions that must be 
satisfied before the sexual abuse occurs: 
1. A potential offender needs to have some motivation to sexually 
abuse a child; 
2. The potential offender has overcome internal inhibitions against 
sexually abusing a child; 
3. The potential offender has overcome external inhibitions against 
sexually abusing a child; and 
4. The potential offender has overcome a child’s resistance to the 
abuse.24 
Of particular interest are preconditions 3 and 4, as they provide insight into 
offender behaviour; ie how offenders go about sexually abusing children. 
 
                                                 
20 Petraitis and O’Connor, above n 15, 214. 
21 Renvoize, above n 12, 101 citing Goddard’s statement for the Law Reform 
Commission of Victoria. 
22 See Petraitis and O’Connor, above n 15, 207-16: statistics collected by the Child 
Exploitation Squad in Victoria between 1988 and 1996 indicate that 50 per cent of all 
child sex abuse allegations investigated by the Squad related to offences allegedly 
committed in the offender’s home. This percentage is likely to understate the figure 
for all offending as the Squad generally did not investigate intra-familial or incest 
allegations, except where there were multiple victims. See also Canadian 
Government, Report of the Committee of Sexual Offences Against Children and 
Youths, Sexual Offences Against Children (1984) Vol 1, 202 where results of a 
National Police Force Survey indicate that 57 per cent of child sexual assault occurred 
in private houses. 
23 Finkelhor, above n 10, 33-67. Finkelhor theorises that a multi-factor model helps to 
explain behavioural diversity. 
24 Ibid 54. 
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1 Overcoming External Inhibitions 
 
Overcoming external inhibitions involves breaking down environmental 
barriers and creating opportunities to offend. Because, by definition, 
paedophiles’ sexual urges and fantasies are intense and recurrent, they often 
go to considerable lengths to create opportunities to offend and it is common 
for paedophiles to establish their lives around children. They frequently place 
themselves in occupations, sporting or service activities, or family situations 
in which they have access to children.25 For instance, offenders may become 
childcare workers, priests/ministers or church volunteers, scout leaders, 
teachers or marry women with children. Indeed, Renvoize has commented 
that increasingly more cases are surfacing of abuse by the very people whose 
responsibility it is to care for the children they abuse.26 Assuming such a role 
not only gives an offender opportunity to be alone with and have power over 
children, it also works to minimise suspicion and detection as we tend to 
regard people in such roles as child carers and not abusers. 
 
Lack of parental supervision is noted as one of the most important factors in 
overcoming external inhibitors.27 Other important factors centre on the child’s 
family structure including: a mother who is absent or ill; a mother who is not 
close or protective or who is dominated or abused by her husband; and social 
isolation of the family.28 These factors provide opportunity to have 
unsupervised access to children and help to provide the perfect victim - an 
emotionally neglected child who is particularly vulnerable and looking for 




                                                 
25 Petraitis and O’Connor, above n 15, 33, 123, 131; Renvoize, above n 12, 110. See 
generally Briggs, above n 14, in which offenders discuss how they establish their lives 
to be around children. This is one aspect of behaviour which sets parent offenders 
apart, as they (typically) have the opportunity to offend by virtue of being a parent. 
26 Renvoize, above n 12, 110. In Adelaide in 2004, a former Anglican Minister, 
former Salvation Army Minister, a Surf Life Saving Coach, a Scouts leader, a Church 
of England Boys Society leader and several Catholic school teachers were all charged 
with paedophile offences: see 
<http://www.news.com.au/common/story_page/0,4057,10427621%255E26462,00.ht
ml> (13 August 2004). 
27 Finkelhor, above n 10, 58. 
28 Ibid 57. 
29 Renvoize, above n 12, 108-9; Wallis, above n 13, 6. See also Roland Summit, ‘The 
Specific Vulnerability of Children’ in R Kim Oates (ed), Understanding and 
Managing Child Sexual Abuse (1990) 59, 62. 
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Offenders are typically ‘seen as conventional, protective and good family men 
with stable work histories’.30 When asked about her experiences in treating 
child sex offenders, a senior child advocate commented: 
 
[T]hey’re usually very pleasant superficially; some of them have been 
overtly sickeningly charming … and they’ve got this propensity to 
suddenly change from that to being very nasty indeed … I feel the 
majority are like that … They can be trying to give a good impression 
but then they turn on you … It’s really interesting the way their 
behaviour changes and you see in them the person who will threaten the 
child.31 
 
This superficial ‘nice guy’ image helps to establish trust with the victim and 
their parents,32 effectively helping to secure preconditions 3 and 4. It also 
minimises the risk of detection as people may refuse to believe that nice guys 
sexually abuse children. 
 
2  Overcoming the Child’s Resistance 
Paedophiles are commonly obsessive, calculative and systematic in their 
offending behaviour. They often show great patience in selecting their 
victims33 and spend considerable amounts of time ‘grooming’ victims and 
their families before offending begins.34 This obsessiveness is well summed 
up by one offender’s admission: ‘I’ve spent 95 per cent of my time grooming 
and raping children’.35 One psychologist has commented that the ‘most 
common form of seduction is to insinuate themselves into the trust of the 
child victim and when possible, the trust of that child’s parents or 
guardians’.36 Parents who have entrusted the care of their child to the 
‘friendly’ paedophile often feel deep conflict when suspicions or allegations 
of abuse arise: there is a tendency to deny the abuse where parents feel 
responsible in that they permitted or even encouraged their child to spend time 
alone with the offender.37 
                                                 
30 Wallis, above n 13, 2. 
31 Renvoize, above n 12, 106-7. 
32 Renvoize, above n 12, 108; Petraitis and O’Connor, above n 15, 101; Howitt, above 
n 7, 79. 
33 Petraitis and O’Connor, above n 15, 132; Summit, above n 29, 70. 
34 See generally Renvoize, above n 12, 108-9; Howitt, above n 7, 83-92; Wallis, 
above n 13, 8-10; Summit, above n 29, 71-2; Joint Committee on the National Crime, 
above n 2, [2.19]. 
35 Petraitis and O’Connor, above n 15, 101. 
36 Wallis, above n 13, 6. See also Howitt, above n 7, 9. 
37 See generally Summit, above n 29, 65-9. 
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Although modus operandi will differ, many offenders spend much time 
breaking down the child’s inhibitions and defences to the sexual act.38 
Enticements include playing games, giving money and other gifts, and even 
choosing children previously victimised by another offender.39 Once the 
child’s trust is established, offenders may begin to desensitise the child to 
sexual advances; they may start with innuendo and subtle advances and 
gradually progress to more overt forms of abuse.40 If the child resists being 
sexually touched, the paedophile may stop the contact, revert back to non-
sexual grooming, and try again later once they feel it is safer to do so.41 Often, 
the child will not even realise that they are being sexually abused where the 
process is drawn out and trust has been established.42 When asked to write a 
‘manual’ for offending, a paedophile wrote: 
 
Play, talking, giving special attention, trying to get the child to initiate 
contact with me. Get the child to feel safe to talk with me. From here I 
would initiate different kinds of contact, such as touching the child’s 
back, head. Testing the child to see how much she would take before 
she would pull away.43 
 
 3  Non-disclosure 
Once the sexual abuse occurs, offenders seek to minimise the risk of being 
detected44 and typically take no responsibility for the abuse by either blaming 
the child or denying that the offences took place.45 Non-disclosure may be 
achieved by moving on to another victim, threats, or attempts to bribe the 
child into ‘keeping the secret’. The grooming process itself may be effective 
in achieving non-disclosure: 
 
By subtly turning this special friendship into sexual exploitation the 
[offender] converts the child gradually into a guilty, disillusioned  
 
                                                 
38 Petraitis and O’Connor, above n 15, 132. See also Summit, above n 29, 71-2. 
39 Howitt, above n 7, 79-80. 
40 Renvoize, above n 12, 108; Wallis, above n 13, 9. 
41 Howitt, above n 7, 84. 
42 Wallis, above n 13, 9. 
43 Howitt, above n 7, 80-1. 
44 Wallis, above n 13, 9. See also Petraitis and O’Connor, above n 15, 100-1. 
45 Briggs, above n 14, viii, x. Briggs comments, at x, that ‘child sex abuse has the 
reputation of being the world’s most consistently denied offence’. See also Howitt, 
above n 7, 93-102. Howitt discusses how offenders seek to minimise their 
responsibility through denial or distorted thinking that they were simply responding to 
the child’s sexual advances. 
2006           Admissibility of Propensity Evidence  9 
 
expatriate, dependent now on the molester to preserve the appearance 
of connection to family and friends through a conspiracy of silence.46 
 
There are many reasons why child victims do not disclose the sexual abuse. It 
is common for the paedophile to tell the child that nobody will believe them 
or that it was the child’s fault because they didn’t say ‘No’ and that they 
enjoyed it.47 This can be a particularly effective way of ensuring non-
disclosure as children are taught to trust and believe adults and may very well 
have enjoyed the attention given to them, the enticements, and some of the 
physical stimulation.48 Where the offender is the parent or guardian, the child 
may be warned ‘if you tell, I’ll go to jail and it will be all your fault’49 and 
keep silent for fear of ‘causing’ a family break up. Children led to believe that 
the abuse was their fault may be scared, embarrassed or ashamed to disclose 
the abuse.50 The child may simply be too young to understand that they are 
being abused51 or find the abuse so painful that they disassociate themselves 
from it as a way of dealing with the situation.52 
 
And efforts to remain undetected are largely successful, with most offenders 
not reported.53 Because many children do not disclose the offences, the 
proportion of unreported offending can only be estimated. However, some 
data is available. In a survey of parents with children living at home between 
the ages of 6 and 14, of the parents who had themselves been victims of 
sexual abuse as a child, only 39 per cent said that they had told someone about 
the experience within a year of its occurrence.54 A Parliamentary Committee 
Report has noted the case of Alister John Caroll who admitted to sexual 
contact with between 100 and 200 children over a 28 year period; only 5 of 
those children were known to have complained to others during those 28 
years.55 
                                                 
46 Summit, above n 29, 72. 
47 Wallis, above n 13, 9-10. 
48 Summit, above n 29, 71-2; Briggs, above n 14, ch xiii. 
49 Wallis, above n 13, 9-10. 
50 Petraitis and O’Connor, above n 15, 128. 
51 Ibid 207-16: statistics collected by the Child Exploitation Squad in Victoria 
between 1988 and 1996 indicate that 33 per cent of alleged offenders investigated by 
the Squad were regarded as preferring victims 10 years or younger. 
52 Summit, above n 29, 63. 
53 Finkelhor, above n 10, 73; Joint Committee on the National Crime, above n 2, 
[2.22]; Briggs, above n 14, xiv. 
54 Finkelhor, above n 10, 73. 
55 Joint Committee on the National Crime, above n 2, [2.22] note 56 citing D G 
Sturgess QC, Director of Public Prosecutions, Queensland, An Inquiry into Sexual 
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Paedophilia studies and recidivism rates highlight the repetitive and chronic 
nature of offending behaviour. International and Western Australian statistics 
show that, without intervention, 80 per cent of imprisoned child sex offenders 
re-offend within one year of being released.56 There have also been claims 
that paedophiles, on average, offend against 150 male or 20 female victims 
depending on their orientation.57 Although these statistics are startling, the 
very nature of paedophilia compels the offender to move from victim to 
victim. As a child matures, they are no longer attractive to the paedophile, 
who is left to find another victim to satisfy their fantasy. What all of this 
research bears out is the fact that many paedophiles can and do victimise a 
number of children. The majority of offences are not reported and even when 
allegations are made, most alleged offenders escape prosecution and 
conviction.58 
 
 D  The Effects of Paedophile Offending 
Although the effects of child sexual abuse are diverse,59 it has been recognised 
that ‘[t]here is no doubt that serious social and psychological harm can be 
caused to some children by sexual abuse in childhood’.60 The extent of trauma 
suffered by the child will depend on a variety of factors including the 
relationship between the paedophile and child, the number and frequency of 
assaults, whether physical force was used, the type of abuse committed and 
the availability of support and treatment after the offending has taken place.61 
The effects include disassociation, anxiety, depression, low self-esteem, self-
hatred, self-destructive behaviour, eating disorders, criminal behaviour, 
substance abuse, revictimisation, psychiatric breakdown, and suicide.62 Where 
the victim has been abused by a same sex offender, the child can be left  
 
 
                                                                                                                    
Offences Involving Children and Related Matters: Report Queensland Government 
Printer, Brisbane, 28 November 1985, paras 4.43ff. 
56 Briggs, above n 14, xiv. See also Renvoize, above n 12, 124. Renvoize notes Ray 
Wyre’s comments that unless treated, ‘fixated’ paedophiles abused another 100 
children after being released and that 55 per cent of all child sex abusers were re-
convicted. 
57 Howitt, above n 7, 77. See also Murray, above n 12, 212. 
58 Briggs, above n 14, xiv. Briggs notes that only about one per cent of reported 
offenders receive prison sentences. 
59 For detailed discussion of the after-effects of child sexual abuse, see Renvoize, 
above n 12, 144-51. 
60 Howitt, above n 7, 63. 
61 Renvoize, above n 12, 145. 
62 Ibid 144-8. 
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confused about their sexual identity.63 And, controversially, it is recognised 
that victims of paedophilia are more likely to become sex offenders 
themselves.64 
 
Renvoize sums up the varying effects of abuse in the following terms: 
 
I have not over-dramatized the after-effects of [child sexual abuse] … it 
is obvious that most of those experiencing the milder forms of abuse 
are able as they grow up to put these aside and proceed with their lives, 
undoubtedly a little damaged … There are, however, incalculable 
numbers of victims who have had to face many years of intense stress 
and pain before arriving at comparative calm, and many thousands 
more whose lives have been ruined for ever beyond repair. This is a 
fact that it is not possible to over-dramatize.65 
 
 III  TESTS FOR THE ADMISSIBILITY OF PROPENSITY EVIDENCE 
 
A  Lord Herschell’s Formulation and the Common Law 
Propensity or similar fact evidence may be defined as all evidence which 
shows or tends to show that on some other occasion the accused acted in a 
way more or less similar to the way in which the prosecution alleges the 
accused acted on the occasion the subject of the present charge.66 Such  
 
                                                 
63 Wallis, above n 13, 11. 
64 See, eg, Wallis, above n 13, 11; Renvoize, above n 12, 149; Finkelhor, above n 10, 
35; Howitt, above n 7, 58. 
65 Renvoize, above n 12, 149. 
66 The expressions ‘propensity evidence’ and ‘similar fact evidence’ are here treated 
as equivalent expressions. An alternative approach is to treat propensity evidence, as 
defined above, as subdivided into two categories, ‘relationship evidence’ (where the 
victim is the same) and ‘similar fact evidence’ (where the victim is different); see R v 
Best [1998] 4 VR 603, 606 (Callaway JA); KRM v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 221, 
229 (McHugh J). This subdivision does not seem to offer any clear benefit, and may 
create uncertainty as to the principles governing the admissibility of relationship 
evidence; see Jonathan Clough, ‘Section 398A of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic): Pfennig 
Resurrected?’ (2000) 24 Criminal Law Journal 8. The definition adopts what is 
sometimes termed a ‘disclosure approach’, rather than a more limited ‘purpose 
approach’; contrast with Andrew Ligertwood, Cross on Evidence (7th Aust ed, 2004) 
639. A wide definition focuses attention on the vice of propensity evidence, which is 
its potential for prejudice. All evidence which shows the accused performed broadly 
similar acts on other occasions possesses this potential for prejudice and is therefore 
brought within the expression. 
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evidence is subject to a general exclusionary rule that prohibits the 
prosecution from leading the evidence, not because it is ‘inherently 
irrelevant’, but because it would be unfairly prejudicial to the accused.67 The 
prejudice to be avoided has been identified as the ‘over-strong tendency to 
believe the defendant guilty of the charge merely because he is a likely person 
to do such acts’ and ‘the tendency to condemn, not because he is believed to 
be guilty of the present charge, but because he has escaped unpunished from 
other offences’.68 
 
Notwithstanding its potential for prejudice, propensity evidence is admissible 
in many situations. Prior to the decision in DPP v Boardman,69 the leading 
case on propensity evidence was Makin v Attorney-General (NSW).70 The 
formulation of Lord Herschell in that case was treated as authoritative of the 
admissibility of propensity evidence,71 notwithstanding that the two sentences 
comprising the formulation (the first one of exclusion and the second one of 
inclusion) could be seen to involve a logical contradiction.72 Two major 
approaches have been adopted in giving a workable meaning to Lord 
Herschell’s formulation. The first approach involves distinguishing between 
evidence which has relevance only via propensity and evidence which has 
relevance other than via propensity, with only the latter type admissible.73  
                                                 
67 DPP v Boardman [1975] AC 421, 456 (Lord Cross); Perry v The Queen (1982) 150 
CLR 580, 585 (Gibbs CJ). 
68 Wigmore, Evidence (1940), Vol 1, 650.  
69 [1975] AC 421. 
70 [1894] AC 57. 
71 Lord Herschell stated at 65: 
It is undoubtedly not competent for the prosecution to adduce evidence tending to 
show that the accused has been guilty of criminal acts other than those covered by the 
indictment, for the purpose of leading to the conclusion that the accused is a person 
likely from his criminal conduct or character to have committed the offence for which 
he is being tried. On the other hand, the mere fact that the evidence adduced tends to 
show the commission of other crimes does not render it inadmissible if it be relevant 
to an issue before the jury, and it may be so relevant if it bears upon the question 
whether the acts alleged to constitute the crime charged in the indictment were 
designed or accidental, or to rebut a defence which would otherwise be open to the 
accused. 
72 See CR Williams, ‘Approaches to Similar Fact Evidence: England and Australia’ in 
Mirfield and Smith (eds), Essays for Colin Tapper (2003) 21, 24. The two sentences 
of Lord Herschell’s formulation constitute an example of what Professor Julius Stone 
has termed ‘Legal Categories of Competing Reference’: J Stone, Legal System and 
Lawyers’ Reasoning (1964) 248-52. 
73 This distinction forms the basis of many judicial interpretations of the propensity 
evidence rule. See, eg, the judgment of Lord Hailsham LC in DPP v Boardman 
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The second approach involves treating the balance between probative value 
and risk of prejudice in each case as determining the admissibility of 
propensity evidence.74 This approach involves treating Lord Herschell’s 
formulation not as containing two conflicting rules, one of exclusion and one 
of inclusion, but rather as referring to two competing principles.75 What Lord 
Herschell’s formulation requires is that these two competing factors, the 
probative value of the evidence and the risk of prejudice, be weighed one 
against the other. If the risk of prejudice is great and the probative value small 
by comparison, the evidence should be rejected. If the probative value is great 




                                                                                                                    
[1975] AC 421, 453, and the judgments of Gibbs CJ in Perry v The Queen (1982) 150 
CLR 580, 585 and in Sutton v The Queen (1984) 152 CLR 528, 533. 
74 ‘Probative value’ is defined as ‘the extent to which the evidence could rationally 
affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue’: LexisNexis 
Butterworths, Butterworths Concise Australian Legal Dictionary (2nd ed, 1998) 350. 
75 On the distinction between rules and principles, see R M Dworkin, Taking Rights 
Seriously (1977) chs 2 and 3. 
76 See generally, L H Hoffman, ‘Similar Facts after Boardman’ (1975) 91 Law 
Quarterly Review 193; Donald Piragoff, Similar Fact Evidence Probative Value and 
Prejudice (1981); Peter Mirfield, ‘Similar Facts – Makin Out?’ [1987] Criminal Law 
Journal 83; Adrian Zuckerman, The Principles of Criminal Evidence (1989) ch 12; 
Peter Mirfield, ‘Similar Facts in the High Court of Australia’ (1990) 106 Law 
Quarterly Review 199; Annalise Acorn, ‘Similar Fact Evidence and the Principle of 
Inductive Reasoning: Making Sense’ (1991) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 63; 
Colin Tapper, ‘The Probative Force of Similar Fact Evidence’ (1992) 108 Law 
Quarterly Review 26; Andrew Palmer, ‘The Scope of the Similar Fact Rule’ (1994) 
16 Adelaide Law Review 161; Colin Tapper, ‘Dissimilar Views of Similar Facts’ 
(1995) 111 Law Quarterly Review 381; Rajiv Nair, ‘Weighing Similar Fact and 
Avoiding Prejudice’ (1996) 112 Law Quarterly Review 262; Andrew Palmer, 
‘Propensity, Coincidence and Context: The Use and Admissibility of Extraneous 
Misconduct Evidence in Child Sexual Abuse Cases’ (1999) 4 Newcastle Law Review 
46; Kenneth Arenson, ‘Propensity Evidence in Victoria: a Triumph for Justice or an 
Affront to Civil Liberties’ (1999) 23 Melbourne University Law Review 263; Jonathan 
Clough, ‘Section 398A of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic): Pfennig Resurrected’ (2000) 24 
Criminal Law Journal 8; Geoffrey Flatman and Mirko Bagaric, ‘Non-similar Fact 
Propensity Evidence: Admissibility, Dangers and Jury Directions’ (2001) 75 
Australian Law Journal 190; David Hamer, ‘The Structure and Strength of the 
Propensity Inference: Singularity, Linkage and the Other Evidence’ (2003) 29 
Monash University Law Review 137 ; CR Williams, ‘Approaches to Similar Fact 
Evidence: England and Australia’ in Mirfield and Smith (eds), Essays for Colin 
Tapper (2003) 21. 
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The decision of the House of Lords in DPP v Boardman77and that of the High 
Court in Perry v The Queen78 gave considerable support to the view that the 
Makin formulation involves a comparison of probative value and prejudice in 
the context of each particular case. Such an approach gives frank recognition 
to the real issues involved in determining whether propensity evidence is 
admissible, and leaves the judge with a wide measure of discretion in 
determining whether to admit propensity evidence. Subsequent developments 
in Australia, both common law and statutory, however have produced a more 
complex situation. Three distinct sets of rules and principles now govern the 
admissibility of propensity evidence. 
 
B  The ‘No Rational View of the Evidence Consistent with 
Innocence’ Test 
 
In a series of decisions following Perry v The Queen, the High Court sought 
to refine its approach to propensity evidence by expressing in various ways 
the nature and extent of the probative force required to justify admissibility.79 
A clear view emerged with the decisions in Hoch v The Queen80 and Pfennig v 
The Queen.81 In Pfennig the majority, comprising Mason CJ, Deane and 
Dawson JJ expressed the requirement for admissibility as follows: 
 
Because propensity evidence is a special class of circumstantial 
evidence, its probative force is to be gauged in the light of its character 
as such. But because it has a prejudicial capacity of a high order, the 
trial judge must apply the same test as a jury must apply in dealing 
with circumstantial evidence and ask whether there is a rational view of 
the evidence that is consistent with the innocence of the accused. Here 
‘rational’ must be taken to mean ‘reasonable’ and the trial judge must 
ask himself or herself the question in the context of the prosecution 
case; that is to say, he or she must regard the evidence as a step in the 
proof of that case. Only if there is no such view can one safely 
conclude that the probative force of the evidence outweighs its  
 
                                                 
77 [1975] AC 421. 
78 (1982) 150 CLR 580. 
79 Sutton v The Queen (1984) 152 CLR 528, 533; De Jesus v The Queen (1986) 61 
ALJR 1; Hoch v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 292; Harriman v The Queen (1989) 167 
CLR 590; S v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 266; Thompson v The Queen (1989) 169 
CLR 1; B v The Queen (1992) 175 CLR 599. 
80 Hoch v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 292. 
81 (1995) 182 CLR 461. For discussion of Pfennig v The Queen see Tapper, 
Dissimilar Views of Similar Facts (1995) 111 Law Quarterly Review 381.  
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prejudicial effect. And, unless the tension between probative force and 
prejudicial effect is governed by such a principle, striking the balance 
will continue to resemble the exercise of a discretion rather than the 
application of a principle.82 
 
The formulation of no ‘rational view of the evidence that is consistent with 
the innocence of the accused’ comes from the elaboration of the criminal 
standard of proof sanctioned by the courts for directing the jury in cases of 
circumstantial evidence.83 Thus, as a criterion of admissibility the judge is 
required to determine whether the propensity evidence satisfies her or him 
beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. Such a test is 
unsatisfactory for three reasons. First, it is difficult to see how a judge can be 
so satisfied when the evidence is sought to be led as part of the prosecution 
case. At this stage the judge may not be aware of the evidence to be called by 
the defence. Second, if applied literally the test would be far more restrictive 
in its operation than other judicial formulations of the similar fact rule.84 A 
requirement that propensity evidence establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt 
is far more demanding than that the evidence possesses ‘striking similarity’ or 
‘sufficient probative value to justify admissibility notwithstanding its potential 
for prejudice’. Finally, it is unsatisfactory to require the judge to ask her or 
himself when considering admissibility precisely the same question the jury is 
to ask itself in determining guilt. Questions must arise as to the perceived 
impartiality of the judge as the trial progresses if, in admitting propensity 
evidence, the judge has effectively said he or she is satisfied beyond 
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused. 
 
In its most recent decision on propensity evidence, Phillips v The Queen,85 the 
High Court affirmed its decision in Pfennig. In a joint judgment, Gleeson CJ, 
Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Heydon JJ rejected modifications of the Pfennig 




                                                 
82 (1995) 182 CLR 461, 482-3. In his judgment, McHugh J preferred the traditional 
common law approach of balancing probative value against risk of prejudice in the 
context of the particular case. 
83 R v Hodge (1838) 2 Lewin 227; 168 ER 1136; Green v The Queen (1975) 11 ALR 
503; Barca v The Queen (1975) 133 CLR 82; Sutton v The Queen (1984) 152 CLR 
528; Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573. 
84 Note R v Best [1998] 4 VR 603, 608-9 (Callaway JA). 
85 [2006] HCA 4. 
86 [2000] 1 Qd R 564. 
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for this Court alone to determine whether one of its previous decisions is to be 
departed from or overruled’.87 
 
One particular application of the no rational view of the evidence consistent 
with innocence test of particular relevance in paedophilia trials is the 
proposition that propensity evidence of other victims is not admissible if there 
exists a possibility of concoction between the victims. In Hoch v The Queen,88 
the accused was convicted on three counts of sexual molestation of boys aged 
under 14. The counts were joined in one indictment and an application for 
separate trials was refused. On appeal it was submitted that the evidence of 
each boy was inadmissible as propensity evidence on the basis that, because 
of demonstrated association between the boys and their antipathy towards the 
accused, there was a real chance that their evidence was concocted. The High 
Court accepted the submission and allowed the appeal of the accused. In a 
joint judgment, Mason CJ, Wilson and Gaudron JJ posited the test of ‘no 
other rational view of the evidence’ and held that ‘the possibility of 
concoction – not a probability or real chance of concoction’ was sufficient to 
render the evidence inadmissible.89 Their Honours stated: 
 
In cases where there is a possibility of joint concoction there is another 
rational view of the evidence. That rational view – viz joint concoction 
– is inconsistent both with the guilt of the accused person and with the 
improbability of the complainants having concocted similar lies. It thus 
destroys the probative value of the evidence which is a condition 
precedent to its admissibility. 
 
 
                                                 
87 Above n 85, [60]. There are perhaps indications in their Honours joint judgment 
that the Court may be willing to re-consider the Pfennig test. In an almost Delphic 
passage their Honours stated at [61] – [62]: 
Nothing said in these reasons should be understood as indicating any view about 
whether it is necessary, or would be desirable, to revisit what is said by this Court in 
Pfennig v The Queen. 
Having regard to the basis upon which the present appeal should be decided and to the 
course taken in argument, it is sufficient to make only two points. First, Pfennig v The 
Queen must be understood against the background of the decisions, especially the 
decisions of this Court, that preceded it. Secondly, taking sentences or parts of 
sentences in reasons for judgment and divorcing them from the context in which they 
sit is to invite error. 
88 (1988) 165 CLR 292. 
89 Ibid 296. 
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Thus, in our view, the admissibility of similar fact evidence in cases 
such as the present depends on that evidence having the quality that it 
is not reasonably explicable on the basis of concoction.90 
It is submitted that the ‘no possibility of concoction test’ application of the 
Pfennig test is an unduly strict approach to adopt in paedophilia trials. In 
England the test was rejected by the House of Lords in R v H,91 and has been 
overturned by statute in Victoria, Queensland and Western Australia.92 If 
applied it would clearly have led to rejection of the evidence in DPP v 
Boardman,93 and indeed in cases where the evidence is far stronger than in 
Boardman. It is difficult to see how the test can be applied, since the issue of 
possible concoction must be determined before the evidence is tested. The 
proposition that evidence must be totally convincing in order to be admitted is 
contrary to the general rule that facts which are a condition precedent to 
admissibility must be established to the standard of the balance of 
probabilities.94 The effect of the decision in Hoch, if applied literally, would 
be to render propensity evidence inadmissible in most cases of incest with 
multiple family members and other cases in which the alleged predatory 
conduct of the accused was focused on child members of a group. There is no 
inherent objection to some measure of collaboration between victims in such 
cases. Indeed, in such cases discussion between victims as a precursor to 
making a formal complaint might be expected and would not, of itself, 
demonstrate that the accused’s prospects of a fair trial had been prejudiced.95 
Where collaboration is or may be present it would be an easy thing for the 
defence to allege concoction which, even in the absence of any supporting 
evidence would be likely to prevent the evidence from satisfying the Hoch ‘no 
possibility of concoction’ test. 
 
C  The Uniform Evidence Acts 
The provisions of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth and NSW) 2001 (Tas) require 
the court to engage in a balancing of probative value and potential for 
 
                                                 
90 Ibid 296-7. In R v Colby [1999] NSWCCA 261, the New South Wales Court of 
Appeal interpreted R v Hoch narrowly as requiring a real danger of concoction. 
91 [1995] 2 AC 596. 
92 See Part III (B) below. 
93 [1975] AC 421. 
94 Wendo v The Queen (1963) 109 CLR 559; R v Savage [1970] Tas SR 137; R v 
Attard and Mifsud [1970] 1 NSWR 750, 758; R v Browne-Kerr [1990] VR 78; DPP v 
Alexander (1990) 120 ALR 673, 682. Note Evidence Act 1995 (Cth and NSW) 2001 
(Tas) s 142. 
95 R v ALP [2002] VSCA 210, [51] (Eames JA). 
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prejudice. Section 97 deals with ‘tendency evidence’, ie evidence tendered to 
prove ‘that a person has or had a tendency (whether because of the person’s 
character or otherwise) to act in a particular way, or to have a particular state 
of mind’. Section 98 deals with ‘coincidence evidence’, ie evidence that two 
or more related events occurred tendered to prove that ‘because of the 
improbability of the events occurring coincidentally, a person did a particular 
act or had a particular state of mind’. The test prescribed for admissibility is 
the same for both classes of evidence. Tendency evidence and coincidence 
evidence are not admissible if ‘the court thinks that the evidence would not, 
either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced 
by the party seeking to adduce the evidence, have significant probative value’. 
The striking of a balance between probative value and risk of prejudice is 
achieved by s 101 which provides that tendency evidence or coincidence 
evidence about an accused that is adduced by the prosecution cannot be used 
against the accused ‘unless the probative value of the evidence substantially 
outweighs any prejudicial effect it may have on the [accused]’.  
 
The balancing process incorporates a bias against admissibility by requiring 
that the probative value of the evidence must both be significant and must 
‘substantially’ outweigh any prejudicial effect it might have on the accused. 
The significance of this bias is difficult to quantify. One view is that the use of 
the word ‘substantially’ may not lead to significantly different results under 
the uniform Evidence Acts to that which applied at common law pre-Pfennig 
and Hoch. It was not the case at common law that an ‘insubstantial’ 
preponderance of probative value over risk of prejudice would lead to 
admissibility. On this analysis the word ‘substantially’ emphasises the need 
for care in admitting propensity evidence, a need which was always 
recognised at common law. Alternatively, the word ‘substantially’ may be 
viewed as having a significant effect in tilting the scales against admissibility. 
In truth, the word ‘substantially’ can probably have as much or as little effect 
as the individual judge wishes. In any event, the balancing process under the 
uniform Evidence Acts is essentially similar to the approach taken at common 
law prior to Hoch/Pfennig, and both at common law and under the uniform 
Evidence Acts the judge is invested with considerable flexibility to have 
regard to the needs of the particular case.  
 
In New South Wales, prior to the decision in R v Ellis,96 a number of cases 




                                                 
96 (2003) 58 NSWLR 700. 
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admissibility.97 Such an approach was incorrect in principle. The Acts pre-
date the decision in Pfennig,98and it is not correct to seek to interpret them as 
incorporating subsequent changes in the common law. In R v Ellis,99 the New 
South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal rejected the earlier cases. Spigelman 
CJ, with whom Sully and O’Keefe JJ agreed, stated: 
 
The continued application of a ‘no rational view’ test is not, in my 
opinion, consistent with a statutory test which expressly requires a 
balancing process and tilts that process in the same direction as that 
which the joint judgment in Pfennig suggested, but by the use of 
different terminology, that is ‘substantially’.100 
 
Hidden and Buddin JJ sought to interpret the provisions as rendering the test 
for admissibility more strict. Their Honours stated: 
 
Underlying the various formulations of the test for admission of similar 
fact or propensity evidence in the common law authorities is the 
recognition that evidence of that kind is likely to be highly prejudicial, 
and of the need to ensure that it is admitted only when the interests of 
justice require it. Its admission at common law is exceptional for 
reasons of policy, not logic. These considerations should guide the 
balancing exercise required by the statutory provision, so that the test 
for admissibility under that provision remains one of very considerable 
stringency.101 
 
Spigelman CJ, however, specifically rejected this gloss on the provisions, 
stating that ‘the statutory formulation should operate in accordance with its 
terms’.102 
                                                 
97 R v AH (1997) 42 NSWLR 702; R v Lock (1997) 91 A Crim R 356; R v Fordham 
(1997) 98 A Crim R 359; R v Ogd (2000) 50 NSWLR 433. Contrast with W v The 
Queen (2001) 189 ALR 633. 
98 The decision in Pfennig was handed down on 17 February 1995. The 
Commonwealth Act was passed on 2 February 1995 and came into force on 18 April 
1995. The New South Wales Act was passed on 19 June 1995 and came into force on 
1 September 1995. The bills had gone before the parliaments in 1993 and were based 
upon draft legislation contained in a report of the Australian Law Reform 
Commission, Evidence, Report No 38 (1987).  
99  (2003) 58 NSWLR 700. 
100  Ibid 717. 
101  Ibid. 
102 Ibid 719. The High Court initially granted leave to appeal, and then rescinded 
leave: Transcript of Proceedings, Ellis v The Queen [2004] HCATrans 488 (1 
December 2004). See also R v Mason (2003) 140 A Crim R 274; R v Gibbs (2004) 
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In 2005, the Australian Law Reform Commission and the Law Reform 
Commissions of New South Wales and Victoria completed a review of the 
uniform Evidence Acts. In their Report, the view of Spigelman CJ in R v Ellis 
is accepted as correct in principle.103 The Commissions’ express preference 
for the current provisions of the uniform Evidence Acts rather than the 
Victorian re-statement of the common law is discussed below.104  
 
D  Statutory Modification of the Common Law 
In Queensland, legislation was introduced in 1997 which had the effect of 
abolishing the Hoch ‘no possibility of concoction’ test while not affecting the 
Pfennig ‘no rational explanation consistent with innocence’ test.105 
 
In Victoria, in the same year more far reaching legislation was introduced 
with the intention of overturning the ‘no rational view of the evidence 
consistent with innocence’ test, and re-instating the common law as it was 
prior to the decisions in both Hoch and Pfennig. In seeking to re-state the pre-
Hoch/Pfennig law, the draftsperson looked to the formulation adopted by the 
House of Lords in DPP v P,106 considered below. In DPP v P, Lord Mackay, 
with whom Lords Keith, Emslie, Templeman and Ackner agreed, stated that 
propensity evidence will be admissible where ‘its probative force in support 
of the allegation that an accused person committed a crime is sufficiently 
great to make it just to admit the evidence, notwithstanding that it is 





                                                                                                                    
146 A Crim R 503; R v Milton [2004] NSWCCA 195; R v Folbigg [2005] NSWCCA 
23. Note however, that in Tasmania v S [2004] TASSC 84, Underwood J stated at 
[11] that ‘if there is a reasonable possibility of concoction, then the prejudicial effect 
will ordinarily outweigh the probative value of the tendency or coincidence evidence’.   
103 Australian Law Reform Commission, New South Wales Law Reform 
Commission and Victorian Law Reform Commission, Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC 
Report No 102, NSWLRC Report 112, VLRC Final Report (2005), 382-4. 
104 Ibid 384-6. 
105 Section 132A of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) provides: In a criminal proceeding, 
similar fact evidence, the probative value of which outweighs its potentially 
prejudicial effect, must not be ruled inadmissible on the ground that it may be the 
result of collusion or suggestion, and the weight of that evidence is a question for the 
jury, if any. See Phillips v The Queen [2006] HCA 4. 
106 [1991] 2 AC 447. 
107 Ibid 460. 
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Section 398A(2) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) follows the language of DPP v 
P, stating that propensity evidence relevant to facts in issue in a proceeding is 
admissible ‘if the court considers that in all the circumstances it is just to 
admit it despite any prejudicial effect it may have on the person charged with 
the offence’.108 Sub-section (3) specifically provides that the ‘possibility of a 
reasonable explanation consistent with the innocence of the person charged 
with an offence is not relevant to the admissibility of evidence referred to in 
sub-section (2).’ In R v Best,109 Callaway JA analysed the provision, 
concluding that the ‘flexibility of the test in sub-section (2) means that, 
properly applied, it will not greatly alter the conduct of criminal trials’.110 His 
Honour concluded: 
 
Propensity evidence is admissible only if its probative value is such 
that it is just to admit the evidence despite any prejudicial effect it 
may have on the accused. All the circumstances bearing on probative 
value and prejudicial effect are relevant, but not factors impugning 
the reliability of the evidence.111 
 
Legislation achieving a similar result was enacted in Western Australia in 
2004.112 In Western Australia the formulation used, however, is the  
 
                                                 
108 Section 398A provides: 
(1) This section applies to proceedings for an indictable or summary offence. 
(2) Propensity evidence relevant to facts in issue in a proceeding for an 
offence is admissible if the court considers that in all the circumstances it 
is just to admit it despite any prejudicial effect it may have on the person 
charged with the offence. 
(3) The possibility of a reasonable explanation consistent with the innocence 
of the person charged with an offence is not relevant to the admissibility 
of evidence referred to in sub-section (2). 
(4) Nothing in this section prevents a court taking into account the possibility 
of a reasonable explanation consistent with the innocence of the person 
charged with an offence when considering the weight of the evidence or 
the credibility of a witness. 
(5) This section has effect despite any rule of law to the contrary. 
For discussion of this provision, see R v Best [1998] 4 VR 603; R v Tektonopoulos 
[1999] 2 VR 412; R v Mateiasevici [1999] 3 VR 185; R v Cogley [1999] 3 VR 366; R 
v Dupas (No 2) [2005] VSCA 212. 
109 [1998] 4 VR 603.  
110 Ibid 612. 
111 Ibid 616. 
112 Section 31A of the Evidence Act 1906 (WA), as amended by the Criminal Law 
Amendment (Sexual Assault and Other Matters) Act 2004 (WA), provides: 
(1) In this section –  
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particularly inelegant one of whether ‘the probative value of the evidence 
compared to the degree of risk of an unfair trial, is such that fair-minded 
people would think that the public interest in adducing all relevant evidence of 
guilt must have priority over the risk of an unfair trial.’ 
 
IV  ADMISSIBILITY 
 
 A  General 
In seeking to achieve a proper balance between considerations favoring 
admission and those favouring rejection of propensity evidence, the fact that 
the accused possesses a propensity towards criminal behavior of any class 
cannot be sufficient to justify admissibility. In Phillips v The Queen, in a joint 
judgment Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Heydon JJ stated: 
 
Criminal trials in this country are ordinarily focused with high 
particularity upon specified offences. They are not, as such, a trial of 
the accused’s character or propensity towards criminal conduct. That is 
why, in order to permit the admission of evidence relevant to several 




                                                                                                                    
‘propensity evidence’ means –  
(a) similar fact evidence or other evidence of the conduct of the accused 
person; or 
(b) evidence of the character or reputation of the accused person or of a 
tendency that the accused person has or had; 
‘relationship evidence’ means evidence of the attitude or conduct of the 
accused person towards another person, or a class of persons, over a 
period of time. 
(2) Propensity evidence or relationship evidence is admissible in proceedings for 
an offence if the court considers –  
 (a) that the evidence would, either by itself or having regard to other 
evidence adduced or to be adduced, have significant probative value; 
and 
(b) that the probative value of the evidence compared to the degree of risk 
of an unfair trial, is such that fair-minded people would think that the 
public interest in adducing all relevant evidence of guilt must have 
priority over the risk of an unfair trial. 
(3) In considering the probative value of evidence for the purposes of 
subsection (2) it is not open to the court to have regard to the possibility 
that the evidence may be the result of collusion, concoction or suggestion. 
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passed. The evidence must possess particular probative qualities; a 
strong degree of probative force; a really material bearing on the issues 
to be decided.113 
 
Nonetheless, in determining when the threshold justifying admissibility is 
reached, considerations relating to the nature of the case and patterns of 
offending behavior may be relevant considerations. Sexual offences against 
children are a class of case in which propensity evidence is very often most 
crucial to the prosecution. Most child sex offending takes place in the 
offender’s home or in other private locations, with the result that typically 
there will be no independent witnesses available to support the prosecution’s 
case. Victims of paedophiles and incest offenders are typically fearful and 
reluctant to report what has occurred, and are often subject to the influence of 
the offender to remain silent. In consequence, many child sexual abuse cases 
are conducted months or years after the event. In such cases there will be no 
medical evidence corroborating the victim’s account of abuse. The fact of 
delay may lead to jury directions favourable to the accused.114 If the only 
evidence directly incriminating the accused is the evidence of the victim and 
the accused denies the victim’s testimony, it is difficult for the prosecution to 
establish its case beyond reasonable doubt. If, however there is admissible 
evidence of similar acts committed by the accused, the victim’s account 
becomes much more credible and the chances of conviction are significantly 
increased. 
 
On the other hand, the dangers inherent in propensity evidence generally are 
greatly enhanced in sexual offence cases.115 The relevance of propensity 
evidence in paedophaelia cases is almost always via propensity, and the 
subject matter is one where the passions of a jury are likely to be at its 
highest. Accordingly, in such cases defence arguments that propensity 
evidence be excluded have particular force. 
 
                                                 
113 [2006] HCA 4 [79]. 
114 Longman v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 79; Doggett v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 
343. For analysis of the requisite warning, see CR Williams, ‘Warnings Occasioned 
by Delay in Paedophile Prosecutions’ (2003) 27 Criminal Law Journal 70. 
115 That prejudice is at its strongest in sexual cases, and particularly those involving 
children is supported by research carried out by Dr Lloyd Bostock on mock juries; 
Law Commission, Consultation Paper, Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Previous 
Misconduct of A Defendant (1996), Appendix D, referred to in Law Commission, 
Final Report, Evidence of Bad Character in Criminal Proceedings (Cm 5257, October 
2001) at paras 6.37-6.42. Further research addressing the effect of such evidence on 
magistrates revealed a similar pattern, Law Commission, Final Report, Appendix A. 
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In DPP v Boardman, the House of Lords had used the expression ‘striking 
similarity’ to describe the similarity between the accounts given by the two 
boys,116 and it was this similarity which gave the evidence its probative force 
and led to the evidence being admitted. This expression would seem to have 
been intended as no more than a method of expressing the probative force of 
the evidence in the particular case. Its alliterative attractiveness no doubt 
helped it to become regarded as itself the test for admissibility of propensity 
evidence.117 In cases of paedophilia however, the evidence typically does not 
derive its primary significance from anything strikingly unusual in the manner 
of committing offences. Its significance rests rather in features of a calculated, 
repetitive, obsessive and predatory nature which are common characteristics 
of the paedophile. 
 
The matter was considered by the House of Lords in DPP v P.118 The accused 
was charged with rape and incest against each of his two daughters, B and S. 
The trial judge rejected an application for severance on the basis that the 
evidence of each girl was admissible in respect of the counts relating to the 
other girl. The accused was convicted on one count of rape and all counts of 
incest in respect of each girl. There was no particular similarity in the course 
of conduct followed by the accused in respect of each girl. On appeal, the 
Court of Appeal felt constrained to allow the appeal, while stating there was 
force in the suggestion that the sexual domination exercised by the accused 
over his daughters might in itself provide a sufficient hallmark to render the 
evidence of one girl admissible in the case of the other.119 
 
The prosecution appealed successfully to the House of Lords. Delivering the 
judgment of their Lordships, Lord Mackay LC stated that it is not appropriate 
to single out ‘striking similarity’ as an essential element in every case of 
propensity evidence. His Lordship stated: 
 
The essential feature of evidence which is to be admitted is that its 
probative force in support of the allegation that an accused person 
committed a crime is sufficiently great to make it just to admit the 
evidence, notwithstanding that it is prejudicial to the accused in tending  
 
                                                 
116 DPP v Boardman [1975] AC 421, 441 (Lord Morris); 444 (Lord Wilberforce); 455 
(Lord Hailsham); 460 (Lord Cross); 462 (Lord Salmon). 
117 See R v Inder (1977) 67 Cr App R 143; R v Clarke (1977) 67 Cr App R 398; R v 
Scarrott [1978] QB 1016; R v Lunt (1987) 85 Cr App R 241; R v Brooks (1990) 92 Cr 
App R 36. 
118 [1991] 2 AC 447. 
119 Ibid 453. 
2006           Admissibility of Propensity Evidence  25 
 
to show that he was guilty of another crime. Such probative force may 
be derived from striking similarities in the evidence about the manner 
in which the crime was committed and the authorities provide 
illustrations of that of which R v Straffen and R v Smith provide notable 
examples. But restricting the circumstances in which there is sufficient 
probative force to overcome prejudice of evidence relating to another 
crime to cases in which there is some striking similarity between them 
is to restrict the operation of the principle in a way which gives too 
much effect to a particular manner of stating it, and is not justified in 
principle.120 
 
His Lordship held that the sexual domination of a father over his daughters, 
which always takes some particular form, might itself be regarded as 
sufficiently uncommon or distinctive to warrant admissibility as propensity 
evidence. His Lordship stated: 
 
In the present case the evidence of both girls describes a prolonged 
course of conduct in relation to each of them. In relation to each of 
them force was used. There was a general domination of the girls with 
threats against them unless they observed silence and a domination of 
the wife that inhibited her intervention. The defendant seemed to have 
an obsession for keeping the girls to himself, for himself. The younger 
took on the role of the elder daughter when the elder daughter left 
home. There was also evidence that the defendant was involved in 
regard to payment for the abortions in respect of both girls. In my view 
these circumstances taken together gave strong probative force to the 
evidence of each of the girls in relation to the incidents involving the 
other, and was certainly sufficient to make it just to admit that evidence 
notwithstanding its prejudicial effect.121 
 
 B  Types of Case 
Typically, paedophilia offenders are known to their victims, and no issue of 
identity arises. Where identity is an issue, paedophilia cases involve issues no 
different from other sexual offence cases where identity is disputed, and a 
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applied.122 Most paedophilia cases, however, involve offenders falling into 
one of two classes. First, cases of incestuous paedophilia. These are cases 
where the offender preys upon a number of his children or members of an 
extended family. Here there is no dispute as to identity, and the issue is 
usually whether the allegations made against the accused are founded in fact 
or malicious concoctions. Second, cases of predatory offenders. These are 
cases where an adult offender consistently, often over many years, preys upon 
children. The offender will commonly pursue a career (school teacher, priest 
or social worker) or social activities that place him in frequent contact with, 
and invest him with a degree of power within the group or groups from which 
his victims are chosen. 
 
Whichever class of case is involved, the fact that paedophilia is involved is 
not of itself sufficient to render propensity evidence admissible. In England in 
the first half of the 20th century, an exception to the first branch of Lord 
Herschell’s formulation developed to the effect that in cases of abnormal 
sexual activity propensity evidence is admissible - the so-called ‘hallmark’ 
doctrine.123 In DPP v Boardman the House of Lords firmly rejected the 
doctrine.124 The hallmark doctrine developed in relation to homosexuality, and 
was grounded in prejudice rather than logic.125 Homosexuality is not and 
never was sufficiently uncommon or particularised to justify such a doctrine. 
The rejection of such a doctrine, however, is also correct in relation to 
paedophilia. While the percentage of members of the community prepared to 
engage in paedophilia is quite limited, membership of such a class cannot of 
itself be regarded as sufficiently probative without more to justify the 
admissibility of propensity evidence.126 The development and rejection of the 
hallmark doctrine remains a potent reminder of the need to proceed with care 
in considering the admissibility of propensity evidence in relation to any class 
of sexual offence. 
 
                                                 
122 Sutton v The Queen (1984) 152 CLR 528; R v Tektonopoulos [1999] 2 VR 412. 
Note Rosemary Pattenden, ‘Similar Fact Evidence and Proof of Identity’ (1996) 112 
Law Quarterly Review 262. 
123 Thompson v The King [1918] AC 221; R v Sims [1946] 1KB 531; R v Hall [1952] 
1 KB 302; R v King [1967] 2 QB 338. 
124 DPP v Boardman [1975] AC 421; see in particular the judgments of Lord 
Hailsham at 455-6 and Lord Wilberforce at 443. 
125 See in particular the judgment of Lord Sumner in Thompson v The King [1918] 
AC 221, 235. 
126 The same is true of other forms of abhorrent sexual activity such as sadism. See 
generally R v Jeffries (1946) 47 SR (NSW) 384; R v Witham [1962] Qd R 49; R v 
Flack [1969] 2 All ER 784; R v Clarke (1977) 67 Cr App R 398, note 117; R v Wright 
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 C  Relationship Evidence 
Evidence of other offences committed against the same victim is normally 
admissible.127 Such evidence is termed relationship evidence,128 and may 
either be the subject of separate counts or may be allegations of uncharged 
offences. Here the evidence possesses significant probative value as showing 
a passion directed towards a particular victim, and is relevant also as bearing 
on the nature of the relationship between victim and accused.129 In R v 
Nieterink, Doyle CJ explained the significance of relationship evidence in 
child sexual abuse cases as follows: 
 
This evidence may disclose a course of events leading up to the first 
charged incident, which enables the jury to understand that the incident 
did not, as it were, ‘come out of the blue’. The evidence will also 
sometimes explain how the victim might have come to submit to the 
acts the subject of the first charge … The evidence of uncharged acts 
may also … make it believable or understandable that the victim might 
not have complained about the incidents charged until much later in 
the piece, if at all … The evidence was also relevant because it could 
establish a sexual attraction on the part of the accused to [the 
complainant].130 
 
For relationship evidence to be admissible, the other offences must be 
established by evidence that is not limited to the testimony of the victim. 
Testimony by the victim as to such offences if unsupported by other evidence 
does not possess sufficient probative weight to justify admissibility having 
regard to its significant potential for prejudice.131 
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D  The Significance of Pattern of Offending Behaviour 
In cases involving different victims the fact that the accused possesses a 
propensity for paedophilia will not of itself be sufficient to justify 
admissibility. To insist, however, that there must be some ‘striking similarity’ 
or peculiar modus operandi raises the bar for admissibility unduly high, and 
posits a test that is not suitable for resolution of the issues involved. The 
significance of the evidence is that it demonstrates a particularized pattern of 
offending behaviour on the part of the accused. Further, the testimony of each 
victim supports that of the others. Were a single allegation made by a 
daughter against her father or by a child against a priest or youth worker, a 
jury might be disinclined to accept the possibility of a respected member of 
the community conducting himself in such a manner. Where there are a 
number of such allegations the evidence of each witness provides powerful 
support for that of the others. These considerations may not justify 
admissibility in particular cases, but they are considerations to be taken into 
account in the balancing process. Such evidence may of course raise issues of 
possible concoction on the part of the alleged victims, and careful directions 
on this possibility must be given to the jury. Given the privacy and the 
absence of other evidence which is characteristic of this type of offence 
however, not to recognise the force of this form of reasoning as supporting the 
case for admissibility may be tantamount to rendering the accused immune 
from successful prosecution. 
 
The Ontario Court of Appeal recognised these considerations in R v B (L).132 
The decision involved two appeals heard together. In the first case, the 
accused was convicted of sexual assault against his stepdaughter. At trial 
evidence was received of sexual incidents involving his two natural daughters 
and the younger sister of his first wife. In the second case, the accused was a 
teacher convicted of offences against former students. At trial evidence was 
received of incidents involving other former students of the accused. In each 
case, the incidents comprising the propensity evidence took various and in no 
way unusual or distinctive forms. The Court dismissed the appeals of both 
accused. Delivering the judgment of the Court, Charron JA stated: 
 
Focusing on the specifics of the allegation assists in the assessment of 
the extent to which the evidence of prior discreditable conduct supports 
the inference that the complainant’s allegation is true. It stands to 
reason that, in this type of case, the more similar the complaints are, the 
higher the probative value … It is also important to consider which 
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similarities are truly compelling. In cases of sexual assault, the 
similarities or dissimilarities between the sexual acts that are alleged 
are, of course, relevant, but often not as compelling as the 
circumstances surrounding the incidents. This stands to reason, 
particularly where there is nothing unusual about the sexual acts in 
question. In most circumstances, the fact that one complainant was 
kissed as compared to the other being fondled may not have a whole lot 
of significance. The allegations all pertain to acts of a sexual nature. In 
the same way, and again depending on the circumstances, the fact that 
assault occurred in the basement as opposed to the other in the 
bedroom may not be of consequence on the question of probative 
value. The different location may simply be attributable to a different 
opportunity for privacy.133 
 
The significance of this line of approach is illustrated by the two cases of R v 
Glennon.134 The accused had been a Catholic priest and youth worker who 
was alleged, over the period between 1970 and 1980, to have taken advantage 
of his position of authority systematically to abuse sexually adolescent males 
and females in his charge. In the first case the trial took place in 1991, prior to 
the enactment of s 398A of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic). The trial judge 
directed the jury that in respect of a number of counts evidence relating to 
other counts could be used as propensity evidence. The Court of Criminal 
Appeal upheld the decision of the trial judge, applying the ‘striking similarity’ 
test. The decision of the court was, it is submitted, correct. The evidence 
established a highly probative pattern of offending behaviour on the part of 
the accused, and that of the others supported the evidence of each boy. It 
seems forced, however, to achieve the result of admissibility through 
application of the ‘striking similarity’ test. The offences did not exhibit 
significant features distinguishing them from the normal run of case involving 
an adult in a position of authority and power systematically using that position 
to exploit sexually young people in his charge. 
 
The second case was on appeal from convictions at two trials, the first of 
which involved 29 counts of various sexual assaults against six separate 
complainants. The judge ruled that evidence in respect of each of the counts 
was mutually admissible, and refused an application for severance of the 
counts involving one particular complainant from the counts involving other 
complainants. The accused was convicted on 24 counts, and unsuccessfully 
appealed to the Court of Appeal. The cross-admissibility of the evidence  
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relating to the various counts was now governed by s 398A of the Crimes Act 
1958 (Vic). The Court of Appeal held that severance was properly not ordered 
if all the evidence was mutually admissible, and that the ruling of the trial 
judge on mutual admissibility was correct. Callaway JA stated: 
 
The applicant was known to each of [the complainants] as a priest and 
in other leadership roles … In all those roles the applicant was in a 
position to exercise, and did exercise, strict discipline over children of 
a vulnerable age. He was in a position of trust derived from his 
personal standing, as well as his standing as a priest, with the 
children’s families. The evidence of the complainants, taken together, 
pointed strongly to a pattern of conduct on the part of the applicant, 
involving the systematic exploitation of vulnerable children within his 
domain in a similar manner. The probative value of the evidence lay in 
the improbability of six complainants giving such connected accounts 
unless those accounts were true.135 
 
A similar case is R v Liddy.136 The accused was a magistrate and coach of 
junior surf lifesavers. It was alleged he had over a period of years used his 
position of authority sexually to molest young boys. The accused was charged 
on 15 counts involving 5 boys between the ages of 8 and 13 years and 
convicted of 9 counts involving 4 of the boys. No issue of possible joint 
concoction arose, the complaints being made years later when the victims 
were adults and no longer associated with one another. Had the case arose 
while the boys still had contact with one another, a strict application of the 
Hoch/Pfennig test would almost certainly have led to inadmissibility. The trial 
judge refused to order severance and held the evidence on the counts cross-
admissible. The Supreme Court of South Australia upheld the decision of the 
judge. Mullighan J summarised the significance of the evidence as follows: 
 
It is capable of negativing innocent association between the appellant 
and each of the boys. It is capable of amounting to corroboration or 
confirmation of the evidence of each complainant about each charged 
act relating to him. The evidence is capable of proving that the 
incidents occurred and all complaints relating similar events is not a 
matter of pure coincidence. It is capable of proving the objective 
improbability of each of the complainants giving accounts of sexual 
conduct by the appellant unless those accounts are true and there is no  
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reasonable view of the evidence other than as supporting an inference 
that the appellant is guilty of the charge under consideration. The 
evidence could negative innocent association. Furthermore, it is 
capable of establishing a sexual attraction on the part of the appellant to 
the complainants and to put their evidence into true context. Also, the 
evidence is capable of establishing that he used the group of boys and 
the activities which he provided for them as the opportunity for his 
offending.137 
 
In R v Glennon (No 1) and R v Liddy, the court was able to hold the propensity 
evidence admissible. The strictness of the Hoch/Pfennig test, however, raises 
doubts as to whether the evidence was in fact properly received in the 
application of that test. In this respect the test posited in DPP v P and s 398A 
of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) is more satisfactory. It does not impose 
restrictions on the manner in which the propensity evidence derives its 
probative force, and consideration of whether it is just to admit the evidence 
invests the judge with considerable flexibility in determining whether in all 
the circumstances of the case reception of the evidence is justified. The 
position under the uniform Evidence Acts is likewise preferable to the 
Hoch/Pfennig approach. While the uniform Evidence Acts perhaps raise the 
bar to admissibility through the requirement that the probative value of the 
evidence ‘substantially’ outweighs its prejudicial effect, the test retains the 
flexibility of the common law approach in determining whether in all the 
circumstances of the case the evidence justifies admissibility notwithstanding 
its potential for prejudice. 
 
V  CONCLUSION 
 
In their habitual offending behaviour, paedophiles seek to establish 
opportunity and overcome the child’s resistance to the sexual acts, typically 
through a grooming process in a manner calculated to minimise the risk of 
detection. It is this very process or pattern of conduct which creates 
significant obstacles to the prosecution of paedophilia offences - the sexual 
abuse usually takes place in private and child victims frequently do not report 
abuse when it occurs. Evidence of similar misconduct of the accused may be 
highly probative in establishing this pattern of paedophilia behaviour, and its 
reception particularly valuable where the only other evidence available is the 
complainant’s testimony. Child sexual abuse is not of itself sufficiently 
specialised to render propensity evidence admissible. It is, however,  
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legitimate for the courts to have regard to the totality of the overall scheme of 
offending in determining the probative value of the evidence.  
 
Evidence of acts against the same complainant (relationship evidence) 
whether charged or uncharged is highly probative in establishing the sexual 
nature of the relationship between the accused and complainant, and is 
generally regarded as sufficiently probative to justify admissibility on this 
basis. Evidence of sexual misconduct against other child complainants is 
relevant to establishing the objective improbability of the accused not having 
committed the crime. In cases where identity is in issue, as the only thing 
connecting the accused to the offences is the method of attack, unless that 
method is highly similar, the evidence fails to establish its purpose and should 
not be admitted. The position is different where the complainant knows the 
offender. Here the circumstances surrounding the sexual abuse may be highly 
probative in establishing the systematic exploitation of vulnerable children by 
a person in a position of trust and authority. 
 
Application of the Hoch/Pfennig test is unduly favourable to the accused and 
ought to be reconsidered by the High Court. Such an approach serves to deny 
the high probative value of the evidence, in circumstances where the very 
nature of offending causes the judge to find that there is another rational view 
of the evidence consistent with the innocence of the accused. Both the 
provisions of the uniform Evidence Acts and the pre-Hoch/Pfennig common 
law, embodied in s 398A of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), provide more 
satisfactory approaches to determining admissibility. 
 
 
